COGNITIVE INTENT DE LEGE LATA?

Abstract

This study aims to analyze whether the legal concept of intent in Brazil prevents the adoption, de lege lata, of a cognitive notion of intent. The study is relevant because if it is understood that the legislator literally decided the issue definitively, judicial interpretation will be predetermined, and scientific debates on the topic will be reduced to a sense de lege ferenda. From a structural perspective, the study initially and briefly presents the reasons for cognitive theories of intent, then analyzes the distinction between rules of conduct and rules of imputation, in order to conclude whether the principle of legality applies, with full force, to the norms set forth in the General Part of the Penal Code. Subsequently, the work outlines how to conceive a concept of intent and then examines the use of the definition technique by the Brazilian legislator, ultimately evaluating whether, literally and based on other traditional hermeneutic canons, there are formal limits to the internalization of a concept of intent without will. In the end, the study answers negatively to the formulated research question.